全文获取类型
收费全文 | 761篇 |
免费 | 58篇 |
国内免费 | 28篇 |
出版年
2022年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 29篇 |
2020年 | 32篇 |
2019年 | 41篇 |
2018年 | 31篇 |
2017年 | 54篇 |
2016年 | 40篇 |
2015年 | 12篇 |
2014年 | 93篇 |
2013年 | 101篇 |
2012年 | 36篇 |
2011年 | 41篇 |
2010年 | 54篇 |
2009年 | 37篇 |
2008年 | 33篇 |
2007年 | 35篇 |
2006年 | 35篇 |
2005年 | 32篇 |
2004年 | 33篇 |
2003年 | 15篇 |
2002年 | 13篇 |
2001年 | 15篇 |
2000年 | 5篇 |
1999年 | 5篇 |
1998年 | 3篇 |
1997年 | 5篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 2篇 |
1994年 | 3篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1992年 | 5篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有847条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
841.
李志刚 《情报指挥控制系统与仿真技术》2010,(1):23-25
针对军事信息系统需求分析需要,探讨了作战活动过程描述、作战节点连接描述、节点状态转换描述和作战活动时序描述的内容和方法。基于该理论和方法,可以准确描述信息化条件下军事人员对军事信息系统的应用需求,实现军事人员与技术人员的有效沟通,为军事信息系统军事需求分析与应用设计的基础。 相似文献
842.
大学教师本身的人文修养所体现出来的师德水平、学识水平、人格魅力以及教学艺术水平,是新时期教师素质的重要组成部分。要在军队高等工程院校中全面推进素质教育,全体教师必须首先提高自身的人文修养水平。 相似文献
843.
针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法。该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立了对应关系。再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定。数学分析表明:对于2×2基本概率矩阵,这样的偏序链长度为3、总数为8,通过对这些偏序链的分析。可以为军事欺骗战法的研究和运用提供科学依据。 相似文献
844.
仲崇玲 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2010,26(5):39-43
在我国,军事权是国家权力体系中一项独立的权力,它是中央军事委员会及其所属各级军事机关依照宪法授权而享有的对武装力量进行统率和管理的一切支配力的总和。我国历史上出现过的十几部宪法或宪法性文件均对其作出了规定。现行的"八二宪法"更是对军事权的权力来源、权力主体、权力范围、权力结构、启动程序和行使结果进行了较为完善的规制。在这些宪法规制的框架下,我们寻求着军事权的"增强"与"节制"这对二律背反的精妙平衡。 相似文献
845.
Kirstin J. H. Brathwaite 《Defence Studies》2018,18(1):1-18
How do we understand combat effectiveness – soldiers’ performance in battle? Despite the broad consensus that understanding combat effectiveness is important both for scholars and policymakers, there is widespread disagreement about what combat effectiveness is. More specifically, studies of effectiveness tend to focus on either the skill of soldiers in battle, or their will to fight. Yet both skill and will are essential components of an effective fighting force. This article argues that understanding combat effectiveness requires understanding both of these key components of effectiveness. In other words, combat effectiveness requires both the skill and will to engage the enemy in an organized manner. It then demonstrates the usefulness of this conceptualization by applying it to the cases of British, Indian, and Australian forces fighting the Japanese during the Second World War. Only when scholars are talking about the same concept will our understanding of the conditions under which militaries are effective in battle progress. By comparing different units fighting the same opponent under the same material conditions, I demonstrate that units vary both in their combat skill and their will to fight, and that understanding their effectiveness in battle requires analyzing both of these key factors. 相似文献
846.
Guillem Colom Piella 《Defence Studies》2016,16(1):1-19
The article analyses the Spanish military transformation. This process started in 2004 as a means to adapt the force structure, organization and capabilities of the Spanish military to meet present and future threats in compliance with NATO’s initiatives, thus ensuring the continuity of the equipment modernization, professionalization and the adjustment of the country’s defence architecture to the post-cold war environment. A decade later, although transformation is still a priority for the Ministry of Defence, limited political will, a lack of strategic guidance, poor resource management and the effects of the economic crisis are compromising its development. This article describes the Spanish military transformation and assesses its value in adapting the country’s armed forces to the current and prospective security environment. 相似文献
847.
ABSTRACTNo issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution – two-tiered security systems – is particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems’ defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d’état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited. 相似文献